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Abstract. The need for flexible, low-overhead virtualization is evident
on many fronts ranging from high-density cloud servers to mobile devices.
During the past decade OS-level virtualization has emerged as a new,
efficient approach for virtualization, with implementations in multiple
different Unix-based systems. Despite its popularity, there has been no
systematic study of OS-level virtualization from the point of view of
security. In this report, we conduct a comparative study of several OS-
level virtualization systems, discuss their security and identify some gaps
in current solutions.
1 Introduction
During the past couple of decades the use of different virtualization technolo-
gies has been on a steady rise. Since IBM CP-40 [19], the first virtual machine
prototype in 1966, many different types of virtualization and their uses have
been actively explored both by the research community and by the industry.
A relatively recent approach, which is becoming increasingly popular due to its
light-weight nature, is Operating System-Level Virtualization, where a number
of distinct user space instances, often referred to as containers, are run on top
of a shared operating system kernel. A fundamental difference between OS-level
virtualization and more established competitors, such as Xen hypervisor [24],
VMWare [48] and Linux Kernel Virtual Machine [29] (KVM), is that in OS-level
virtualization, the virtualized artifacts are global kernel resources, as opposed
to hardware. This allows multiple virtual environments to share a common host
kernel and utilize underlying OS interfaces. As a result, OS-level virtualization
incurs less CPU, memory and networking overhead, which is important not only
for High Performance Computing (HPC), such as dense cloud configurations,
but also for resource constrained environments such as mobile and embedded
devices. The main disadvantage of OS-level virtualization is that each container
can only contain a system of the same type as the host environment, e.g. Linux
guests on a Linux host.
An important factor to take into account in the evaluation of the effective-
ness of any virtualization technology is the level of isolation it provides. In the
context of OS-level virtualization isolation can be defined as separation between
containers, as well as the separation between containers and the host. In order
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to systematically compare the level of isolation provided by different OS-level
virtualization solutions, one first needs to establish a common system model.
The goal of this study is to propose a generic model for a typical OS-level
virtualization setup, identify its security requirements, and compare a selection
of OS-level virtualization solutions with respect to this model. While other tech-
nologies as HW supported secure storage, various encryption primitives and spe-
cific CPU/memory features can enhance the security of OS-level virtualization
solutions, they are left out of the scope of this paper and present the potential
future work. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of this kind that
focuses on the security aspects of OS-level virtualization technologies. We base
our analysis on information collected from the documentation and/or wherever
possible the source code of the respective systems. As a result of this compari-
son section 9 identifies a number of gaps in the current implementation of Linux
OS-level virtualization solutions.
2 Usage Scenarios
We identify the following common usage scenarios as motivation for OS-level
virtualization in general. The first three originate from use cases in the context
of warehouse scale computing. The latter two stem from security needs.
In Server consolidation, a set of distinct physical servers are substituted
with a single physical server running a number of distinct virtual environments.
Solutions based on hardware virtualization often require that the guest OS be
modified; either to support the virtualization solution itself (as in the case of
paravirtualization) or to facilitate interaction between the guest and host OSs
by installing special-purpose components into the guest (as in full virtualization
solutions such as VMWare, Virtual Box etc.) [47]. In contrast, one of the goals
for OS-level virtualization is to provide a set of tools integrated into the OS to
allow the creation and management of virtual environment without modifica-
tions to the software components placed inside a container. In Virtual Private
Server (VPS) and cloud computing environments, where service providers grant
superuser-level access in the rented virtual environments to customers, strict
isolation between environments of different customers and the hosting provider
is important unlike in server consolidation where all virtual environments are
managed by the same entity.
Resource and application state management emerged from the need
to run a number of distinct applications or multiple instances of a single ap-
plication which require access to the same resources on a single machine, e.g.
binding to the same network port. In addition by placing an application into
a self-contained compartment it is possible to provide Checkpoint and Restart
(CR) functionality [17,47,30]. CR allows processes to be moved between differ-
ent physical or virtual environments. This can be useful for load-balancing or in
high-availability environments, as well as software development and testing on
different UNIX platforms.
A Multi-OS experience allows end-users the ability to use applications and
services from different operating systems on the same device by the means of
virtualization technology. While the OS-level virtualization is limited to systems
sharing a common kernel, it can provide a way for the user to run a number
of different OS variants on the same system. Since there are many new mobile
operating systems on the rise such as Android, Tizen, FirefoxOS and the like,
feature is likely to be useful for many experienced users. The need to share certain
data, like the user’s contacts or calendar, across the different OSs installed on
the same device brings in an additional challenge for this use case.
Application or service isolation places critical and externally exposed
services into separate sandbox environments that are able to contain damage in
case sandboxed services become compromised. Sandboxing also makes it possible
to delegate the administration of these services to third, possibly less trusted,
parties [28].
The Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy [37] allows one physical
device to be used simultaneously for personal and business needs resulting in
a need of rigid separation between these two environments in order to guar-
antee user privacy while conforming to enterprise policies. Presenting separate
environments to the end-user can also improve the usability of the solution [2],
compared to domain separation by means of access control mechanisms alone.
3 System model
In Figure 1(a) we present a system model for a typical container setup that
can support the types of usage scenarios we discussed in Section 2. There are a
number of containers C1 . . . Cn that run on a single physical host machine. The
OS kernel is shared among all the containers, but the extent of shared host user
space depends on a concrete setup (see Table 1):
Full OS installation & management corresponds to the most common
case when the host user space layer comprises a complete OS installation with
the container management layer on top. In this case some host resources may
be shared between the host and one or more containers via bind-mounts [25] or
overlay filesystems [20]. Each container can be one of two types:
– Application containers have a single application or service instance running
inside. They are commonly used for application isolation or resource man-
agement referred to in Section 2.
– System containers have an entire OS user space installation and are com-
monly used for server consolidation.
Lightweight management corresponds to the case where the host user
space layer consists of merely a light-weight management layer used to initialize
and run containers. This setup can be argued to be more secure, as it exhibits a
reduced attack surface compared to a complete underlying host system. Again,
each container can be one of two types:
– Direct application/service setup refers to the case when only a single applica-
tion or service is installed in the container. It is more suitable for application
isolation scenarios in which, for instance, a banking application is run in a
separate container isolated from the rest of a less trusted OS running in
another container.
– Direct OS setup refers to the case when a container runs an entire OS user
space installation. It can provide an end-user the appearance of simultane-
ously running multiple OS instances, and is therefore well suited for Multi-OS
and BYOD environments.
(a) System model (b) Attacker model
Fig. 1. OS-level virtualization
Container
Host user space layer Application/Service Full OS
installation
Full OS installation &
management
Application container System container
Lightweight management Direct Application/Service
setup
Direct OS setup
Table 1. Types of OS virtualization setups
The system model described above intentionally omits cases where containers
C1 . . . Cn are not independent, but arranged in a hierarchical structure. While
some systems, such as FreeBSD jails [28], allow such setups, they are rarely used
in practice and are therefore left beyond the scope of this report.
4 Attacker model and security requirements
The attacker is assumed to have full control over a certain subset C¯ of containers.
The remaining set C is assumed to be in the control of legitimate users. The
goals of the attacker can be classified as follows:
– Container compromise: compromise Ck ∈ C by means of illegitimate
data access, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks or by affecting the control
flow of instructions executed in Ck ∈ C.
– Denial of Service: disturb normal operation of the host or Ck ∈ C.
– Privilege escalation: obtain a privilege not originally granted to a Cj ∈ C¯.
The above goals can be achieved via different types of attacks that can be
roughly classified into distinct groups based on the interfaces available in a typ-
ical Single UNIX Specification compliant OS [45]. These attack groups can be
further arranged into two classes based on the type of underlying mechanism: at-
tacks via communication mechanisms and attacks via storage mechanisms (see
Figure 1(b)). From this classification we derive a set of security requirements
that each OS-level virtualization solution needs to fulfill. In the description be-
low, numbers in parenthesis refer to arrows in Figure 1(b).
Separation of processes is a fundamental requirement that aims to isolate
processes running in distinct containers to prevent Cj ∈ C¯ from influencing Ck ∈
C using interfaces provided by the operating system for process management,
such as signals and interrupts (1a). In addition, it might be possible to directly
access the memory of a process running in Ck ∈ C by using special system calls,
e.g. the ptrace() system call allows a debugger process to attach and monitor
the memory of a debugged process (1b).
Filesystem isolation is required in order to prevent illegitimate access to
filesystem objects belonging to Ck ∈ C or the host (2).
Device isolation should protect device drivers shared between different
containers and a host. Such drivers present another significant attack vector
because they expose interfaces (3) to code running into the kernel space, which
may be abused to gain illegitimate data access, escalate privileges or mount other
attacks.
IPC isolation is needed in order to prevent Cj ∈ C¯ from accessing or
modifying data belonging to Ck ∈ C being transmitted over different IPC chan-
nels (4). Such channels include traditional System V IPC primitives, such as
semaphores, shared memory and message queues as well as POSIX message
queues.
Network isolation aims to prevent attacks by Cj ∈ C¯ via available network
interfaces (5). In particular, an attacker can attempt to eavesdrop on or modify
network traffic of the host or Cj ∈ C¯, perform MitM attacks etc.
Resource management provides a way to limit the amount of resources
available to each container depending on the system load. This is needed in
order to prevent an attacker from exhausting physical resources available on a
device, such as disk space or disk I/O limits, CPU cycles, network bandwidth
and memory (6).
5 Terminology
We define the following terms that are going to be used through the remaining
of this report and that might be not familiar for a reader without a Unix/Linux
background:
– Kernel space refers to the part of the virtual memory that is used to run
the OS kernel code, modules, drivers and extensions.
– User space denotes the part of the virtual memory that includes the user
applications, system processes (daemons) and services.
– Kernel resource is a kernel structure referring to shared physical or virtual
devices, system resources, such as memory or cpu time, or a set of identifiers
used through the kernel.
– Superuser/privileged user is a special user in UNIX-like systems that is
allowed to perform privileged system operations. UNIX classical root user is
an example of such user.
– Linux capabilities is a set of predefined capabilities implemented in the
Linux kernel for performing different privileged operations, such as mounting
a filesystem or overwriting the system security policies. Such capabilities are
often referred as POSIX capabilities.
– Filesystem root denotes the top-most directory in the UNIX filesystem
hierarchy as it is visible to running processes.
– Upstream/mainline Linux kernel refers to the Linux kernel source code
tree maintained at kernel.org. This is the official Linux kernel source that
contains all the released and upcoming features.
6 Overview of technologies
6.1 FreeBSD Jails
The pioneering notion of Jails was first introduced in FreeBSD 4.0 in 2000 [28].
The motivation behind Jails was the need to have separate virtual compartments
on a single host, combined with the ability to delegate a subset of the traditional
superuser privileges to the root user for each compartment. A number of changes
were introduced to the FreeBSD kernel in order to implement Jails. These include
the hardening of the chroot(2) system call, basic isolation that would restrict a
jailed process from communicating with processes outside the Jail, the ability
to limit the visibility of processes via the procfs pseudo filesystem and sysctl
interfaces, restrictions on TCP/IP networking, Jail-aware device drivers, and
the ability to restrict a root user inside a Jail from performing certain system
calls. Later on the ability to have multiple IP-addresses per Jail, more powerful
Jail management facilities and the ability to create hierarchical Jails were added.
6.2 Linux-VServer
The need for a mechanism similar to FreeBSD Jails in Linux led to the Linux-
VServer project [8]. The first official release of the Linux-VServer occurred in
2003. In Linux-VServer, separate virtual environments are referred to as Virtual
Private Servers (VPSs). They can be managed with the help of user space tools
provided by the util-vserver package. Each VPS has its own context that con-
tains all the information regarding the VPS; its name, allowed limits, bounded
capabilities, scheduler information etc. In addition, the behavior of each VPS
can be further adjusted by specifying context capabilities and flags that allow a
VPS to modify its host name or hide network interfaces that a certain VPS is
not permitted to access. The biggest downside with regards to deployability is
the need to apply the Linux-VServer patches to kernel source code and recompile
the kernel as the Linux-VServer changes are currently not integrated into the
mainline Linux kernel development branch.
6.3 Solaris Zones
Solaris Zones/Containers project [35] was started in 2004 in order to provide
a commercial OS-level virtualization solution. Sun engineers analyzed FreeBSD
Jails and Linux-VServer solutions available at the time and concluded, that while
the goals of the projects are similar, the depth of OS integration, quality of ad-
ministrative tools and overall maturity of the aforementioned projects were not
at a level needed to support commercial solutions. In addition, they also wanted
to create a set of usable zone management tools that would enable the delega-
tion of zone setup and configuration whenever possible to the administrators of
a zone. The isolation provided by Solaris Zones is based on attaching a zone
identifier to a process, and using it to restrict the visibility of the process across
zone boundaries. The zone identifier is also used to determine process privileges
inside non-global zones, System V IPC communication etc. Resource manage-
ment is implemented using standard mechanisms provided in Solaris, such as
entitlements, limits and partitions. When used together, they are able to ensure
a minimal level of service, bound resource consumption and even the dedication
of certain resources only to specific zones.
6.4 OpenVZ
The OpenVZ project [11] is another open source OS-level virtualization solution
for Linux begun in 2005. It is currently part of the commercial Parallels Cloud
Server solution [12]. OpenVZ uses the term Virtual Environments (VEs) [47]
to refer to containers. The implementation consists of set of kernel changes and
user space tools. The OpenVZ kernel is based on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux
kernel, which in turn is based on the relatively old 2.6.32 upstream Linux ker-
nel. However, OpenVZ developers have integrated many of their kernel modi-
fications into the upstream kernel. Hence, the project’s main user space tool,
vzctl, can be used with both upstream and OpenVZ kernels, but the developers
“recommend using the OpenVZ kernel for security, stability and features”. The
OpenVZ project was also the first one to implement the Checkpoint and Restart
(CR) functionality for for VEs [30]. CR allows processes to be moved between
different physical or virtual environments. This can be useful for load-balancing
or in high-availability environments, as well as software development and testing
on different UNIX platforms.
6.5 LxC
The Linux Containers (LxC) project [9] is the only currently available OS-level
virtualization solution for Linux that consists only of a set of user space tools.
This is possible because LxC utilizes only those virtualization features integrated
into the upstream Linux kernel. This gives LxC an advantage over other Linux-
based projects, because the process of applying patches and compiling a specific
version of the Linux kernel can become a non-trivial task even for experienced
Linux users. Another differentiating feature of LxC is the ability to use Linux
Security Modules (LSMs) [41] to harden a container setup. Apparmor [1] and
SELinux [38] profiles are officially supported, but in principle, other existing
LSMs, such as Smack [15] could be used as well.
6.6 Cells/Cellrox
The Cells architecture [22] and the commercial Cellrox solution [2] built on the
Cells architecture are the only open source OS-level virtualization solutions for
smartphones. The primary design goal behind Cells is to support the Bring
Your Own Device (BYOD) policy [37] on the Android platform. BYOD allows
one physical device to be used simultaneously for personal and business needs
resulting in a need of rigid separation between these two environments in order
to guarantee user privacy while conforming to enterprise policies. Cells allows a
user to have two or more virtual phones on the single Android device, e.g. one for
personal use and another, which can be controlled by the user’s employer and can
contain confidential company data and applications. The user can switch between
the virtual phones using a special icon on the Android home screen. Similarly to
LxC, Cells utilizes upstream kernel features to isolate virtual phones. However,
since Android has some non-standard Linux extensions, the developers of Cells
had to implement a number of additional isolation mechanisms. The primary
example are the changes done to the Binder driver in order to support IPC
isolation on Android.
container structure separate namespaces
pros simplicity, convenience flexibility, incremental introduction of
containerization
cons possible information duplication,
less flexibility
increased complexity
used
by
FreeBSD, SolarisZones,
Linux-VServer, OpenVZ
Linux-VServer, OpenVZ, LxC, Cells
Table 2. Comparison of containerization approaches
7 Comparison
Following [17], we define the notion of a kernel namespace as a set of identifiers
representing a class of global kernel resources, such as process and user ids, IPC
objects or filesystem mounts. The OS-level virtualization in the upstream Linux
kernel is based on the usage of different kernel namespaces. The subsections
below introduce the relevant namespaces and compare selected OS-level virtu-
alization solutions, highlighted in bold in the previous paragraph, based on the
security requirements listed in section 4.
7.1 Separation of processes
The primary isolation mechanism required from any OS-level virtualization solu-
tion is that it is able to distinguish processes running in different containers from
those running on the host, limit cross-container process visibility and to prevent
memory and signaling-level attacks described in the section 4. The simplest so-
lution to this problem is to embed a container identifier Ci into the process data
structure and to check the scope and the permissions of all syscall invocations.
FreeBSD Jails, Solaris Zones, OpenVZ and Linux-VServer implementations
follow this approach by linking a structure describing the container to the pro-
cess data structure. However, unlike FreeBSD and Solaris, the data structures
describing OpenVZ and Linux-VServer containers are not used to achieve pro-
cess separation. They only store related container data such as resource limits
and capabilities. Instead, OpenVZ, Linux-VServer, LxC and Cells use process id
(pid) namespaces that are part of the mainline Linux kernel. A pid namespace
is a mechanism to group processes in order to control their ability to see (for
example via proc pseudo-filesystem) and interact (for example by sending sig-
nals) with one another. The pid namespaces also provide pid virtualization: two
processes in different pid namespaces may have the same pid.
Having a separate structure describing a container and storing a pointer to it
in the process task structure is a convenient way to have all the relevant informa-
tion concerning the container in one place. However, the upstream Linux kernel
has followed a different approach of grouping different kernel resources into sepa-
rate namespaces and using these namespaces to build containers. This approach
incurs additional complexity, but adds the flexibility to choose a combination of
namespaces that best fits the desired use case. It also allows gradual introduc-
tion of namespaces to an existing system, like the upstream Linux kernel, which
also helps in testing and verification of the implementation [17]. Furthermore, it
avoids information duplication when both the process and the container struc-
tures have similar information. The pros and cons of these two approaches are
summarized in Table 2.
In addition to the ability to isolate and virtualize process ids, the upstream
Linux kernel also allows virtualization and isolation of the user and group iden-
tifiers with the help of user namespaces. Typically the root user has all the
privileges to perform various system administration tasks and is able to override
all access control restrictions. However, it is not desired that a root user running
inside a container would be given the privileges of the host root user. Therefore,
the Linux user namespace implementation interprets a given Linux capability as
authorizing an action within that namespace: for example, the CAP SYS BOOT
capability inside a container grants the authority to reboot that container and
not the host. Moreover, many capabilities such as CAP SYS MODULE can-
not be safely granted for container in any meaningful manner. When a process
attempts to perform an action guarded by such capability, the kernel always
checks if the process possesses this capability in the host user namespace. All
Linux OS-level virtualization solutions support the option of starting a new user
namespace for each container, but all the related configuration such as mapping
the user identifiers between the host and the container must be done manually.
7.2 Filesystem isolation
The filesystem is one of the most important OS interfaces that allows processes
to store and share data as well as to interact with one another. In order to
prevent filesystem-based attacks described in section 4, it should be possible to
isolate the filesystem between containers and to minimize the sharing of the data.
The amount of sharing needed between the host and each container depends on
the usage scenario. In the case of application isolation, it is not worthwhile to
completely duplicate the OS setup inside a container and therefore some parts
of the filesystem, such as common libraries, need to be securely shared with
the host. On the other hand in the case of server consolidation, quite often it
is best to completely separate the filesystems and create container filesystems
from scratch.
All Linux-based OS virtualization solutions utilize a mount namespace that
allows separation of mounts between the containers and the host. The design of
upstream Linux mount namespaces[17] has been influenced by private names-
paces [34] in Plan 9 from Bell Labs [33]. Namespaces in Plan 9 are file-orientated,
and the principal purpose is to facilitate the customization of the environment
visible to users and processes. Since all Linux based systems create each con-
tainer within a new mount namespace, all the internal mount events are only
effective inside the given container. However, it is important to underline that
the mount namespace by itself is not a security measure. Running a container in
a separate mount namespace does not give any additional guarantees concern-
ing the data isolation between the containers since containers inherit the view
of filesystem mounts from their parent and thus are able to access all parts of
the filesystem similarly.
A typical approach for process filesystem access containment is by using the
chroot() system call where process is bound within a subtree of the filesystem
hierarchy. If desired, resources may be shared with the host by mounting them
within the subtree visible inside the container. Since the chroot() system call [7]
only affects pathname resolution, privileged processes (i.e. processes with the
CAP SYS CHROOT privilege) can escape the chroot jail. This can be done for
example by changing the root directory again via chroot() to a subdirectory
relative to their current working directory. Of the virtualization solutions under
comparison, only Cells relies on chroot() alone. Some systems, such as Linux-
VServer utilize a Secure chroot barrier [8] to prevent processes in a VPS from
escaping the modified environment.
Another approach, utilized by for instance LxC, is to not only modify the
root directory for processes in a container, but modify the root filesystem as well.
This can be achieved with the Linux specific pivot root() system call [7], which
is typically used during boot to change from a temporary root filesystem (e.g.
an initrd) to the actual root filesystem. As its name suggests, the pivot root()
system call moves the mountpoint of the old root filesystem to a directory under
the new root filesystem, and puts the new root filesystem at its place. When
done inside a mount namespace, the old root filesystem can be unmounted, thus
rendering the host root filesystem inaccessible for processes inside the container,
without affecting processes belonging to the root mount namespace on the host
system. At the time of writing, the implementation of pivot root() also changes
the root directory and current working directory of the process to the mountpoint
of the new root filesystem if they point to the old root directory. OpenVZ relies
on this behavior and uses the pivot root() system call alone. However, as the
behavior with regards to the current root directory and the current working di-
rectory remains unspecified, proper usage dictates that the caller of pivot root()
must ensure that processes with root directory or current working directory at
the old root operate correctly regardless of the behavior of pivot root(). To en-
sure this, LxC changes the root directory and current working directory to the
mountpoint of the new root before invoking pivot root().
FreeBSD and Solaris also provide a sandbox-like environment for each jail/zone
using similar chroot()-like calls that are claimed to avoid above mentioned secu-
rity vulnerabilities [28], [35]. Mounting and unmounting of filesystems is prohib-
ited by default for a process running inside a jail unless different allow.mount.*
options are specified.
A separate user namespace per container can further strengthen the filesys-
tem isolation by mapping the user and group ids to a less privileged range of
host uids and groups. Together with a mount namespace and a pivot root en-
vironment it strengthens protection against filesystem-based attacks described
in 4.
7.3 Device isolation
In Unix, device nodes are special files that provide an interface to the host
device drivers. In classical Unix configurations, the device nodes are separated
from the rest of the filesystem and their inodes are placed in the /dev directory.
In the case of Linux, this task is usually performed by the udevd daemon process
issuing the mknod system call upon receiving the event from the kernel. Device
nodes are security-sensitive since an improperly exposed or shared device inside
a container can lead to a number of easy attacks (see section 4). In the simplest
example, if a container has an access to /dev/kmem and /dev/mem nodes, it
is able to read and write all the memory of the host. Thus, in order to isolate
containers from one another it is important to prevent containers from creating
new device nodes and to make sure that containers are only allowed to access a
“safe” set of devices listed below:
1. Purely virtual devices, such as pseudo-terminals and virtual network in-
terfaces. The security guarantee comes from the fact that these devices are
explicitly created for each container and not shared.
2. Stateless devices, such as random, null and others. Sharing these devices
among all containers and the host is safe because they are stateless.
3. User namespace-aware devices. If a device supports verifying process
capabilities in the corresponding user namespace, then it is safe to expose
such device to a container, because the specified limitations will be enforced.
The current 3.14-rc2 upstream kernel does not have any physical devices
supporting this feature, but they are expected to appear in the future.
All compared systems allow the system administrator to define a unique set of
device nodes for each container and by default create only a small set of stateless
and virtual devices. In Linux, creation of new device nodes within containers can
be controlled by limiting access to the CAP SYS MKNOD Linux capability and
by ensuring that all mountpoints inside containers have the nodev flag set.
The biggest difference of the Cells implementation is the addition of a “device
namespace” that attempts to make the Linux input/output devices namespace-
aware. Cells assumes the host to have a single set of input/output devices and
multiplexes access to the physical host device via virtual devices created in each
container. One virtual device at a time is allowed to access physical devices,
based on whether an application from a given container is “on the foreground”
(ie. visible on the screen) or not. Security-wise such an exclusive-access solution
is comparable to the “purely virtual” devices category mentioned above and can
be considered safe.
As mentioned above, Linux device drivers controlling physical devices are
currently not namespace-aware and thus cannot be securely used inside contain-
ers. Quite commonly these devices assume only one controlling master host and
require privileges that are hard to grant for a unprivileged container securely
(unless the device is used exclusively by a single container). In other words,
namespace support inside the device drivers would require extensive modifica-
tions to the existing driver code base.
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Table 3. Comparison of network isolation
7.4 IPC isolation
In order to achieve IPC isolation between containers, processes must be restricted
to communicate via certain IPC primitives only within their own container. If the
filesystem isolation is done correctly (see section 7.2), then filesystem-based IPC
mechanisms (such as UNIX domain sockets and named pipes) are automatically
isolated because the processes are not able to access filesystem paths outside
of their own container. However, the isolation of the rest of the IPC objects
(such as System V IPC objects and POSIX message queues) requires additional
mechanisms. In Linux these IPC objects are isolated with the help of the IPC
namespaces that allow the creation of a completely disjoint set of IPC objects.
Linux-VServer, OpenVZ, LxC and Cells all spawn a new IPC namespace for
each container in order to achieve the required isolation.
In addition to using IPC namespaces, Cells also has to implement namespace
support for the Binder system since it is the primary IPC mechanism on the
Android OS. The solution [10] includes having a separate Context Manager
for each IPC namespace that is able to resolve Binder addresses only in that
namespace and therefore provide isolation of Binder addresses between different
containers.
Solaris Zones follow a different approach to isolate IPC objects that are not
filesystem path-based. A zone ID is attached to each object based on the zone
ID of the process that creates it, and processes are not able to access objects
from other zones. An exception is made only for an administrator in the global
zone that can access and manage all the objects. FreeBSD simply blocks SysV
IPC object-related system calls if such calls are issued from within a jail. The
allow.sysvipc option allows SysV IPC mechanisms for jailed processes but lacks
any isolation between jails.
7.5 Network isolation
The main goal of network isolation is to prevent network-based attacks described
in section 4. Moreover, in order to fulfill the server consolidation and resource
management use cases, it also needs to provide a virtualized view of the network
stack.
Network isolation methods differ in terms of the OSI layer of the TCP/IP
stack where the isolation is implemented (see Table 3 for a comparison between
these implementations). FreeBSD and Linux-VServer implement network isola-
tion on Layer 3 with the help of bind filtering. They restrict a bind() call made
from within a container to a set of specified IP addresses and therefore processes
are only allowed to send and receive packets to/from these addresses. The bene-
fit of such an approach is the small amount of code that needs to be modified in
the network implementation and a minimal performance overhead. However, the
downside is that a lot of the standard networking functionality is not accessible
for a process inside a container such as obtaining an address from the Dynamic
Host configuration Protocol (DHCP), acting as a DHCP server or the usage of
routing tables.
Another approach, supported by Solaris Zones and OpenVZ, provides a Layer
3 virtualized network interface (VNI) for each container. Compared to bind
filtering this implementation is more flexible since it allows the configuration of
different traffic control settings, such as traffic shaping and policing, from within
the container. The Layer 3 implementation provided by OpenVZ is called venet,
while Solaris uses the term shared-IP zone.
The third approach includes providing a Layer 2 virtualized network inter-
face for each container with a valid Link layer address. This gives containers
the ability to use many features that are not supported by the previous two
solutions, such as DHCP autoconfiguration, separate routing information and
filtering rules. This approach can also support a broader set of network config-
urations. However, the primary downsides include a performance penalty and
the inability to control the container networking setup from the host. The lat-
ter can be important for the server consolidation case if the host administrator
needs to be in the control of the overall network configuration. OpenVZ, Solaris,
LxC and Cells all support the creation of the Layer 2 virtualized interfaces.
On Linux platforms this feature is called virtual Ethernet (veth). On Solaris a
similar configuration is named exclusive-IP zone.
The Linux Layer 2 network isolation is based on the concept of a network
namespace that allows the creation of a number of networking stacks that ap-
pear to be completely independent. The simplest networking configuration for a
container running in a separate network namespace includes a pair of virtually
linked Ethernet (veth) interfaces and assigning one of them to the target names-
pace while keeping the other one in the host namespace. After the virtual link
is established, interfaces can be configured and brought up [6].
Linux provides multiple ways for connecting containers to physical networks.
One option is connecting the veth interface and the host physical interface by
using a virtual network bridge device. Another option is to utilize routing tables
to forward the traffic between virtual and physical interfaces. When a virtual
bridge device is used, all container and host interfaces are attached to the same
link layer bridge and thus receive all link layer traffic on the bridge. However,
in the case of route configuration, containers are not able to communicate with
each other unless a network route is explicitly provided. Also in the latter case,
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container addresses are not visible to outsiders like in bridged mode. Another
way of providing network connectivity for containers is to use the MACVLAN
interface [9] that allows each container to have its own separate link layer ad-
dress. MACVLAN can be set to operate in a number of modes. In a private
mode containers cannot communicate with each other or the host making it
the strictest isolation setup. The bridge mode allows containers to communicate
with one another, but not with the host. The Virtual Ethernet Port Aggregator
(VEPA) mode by default isolates containers from one another, but leaves the
possibility to have an upstream switch that can be configured to forward packets
back to the corresponding interface. Currently LxC is the only solution that can
support all the MACVLAN modes.
7.6 Resource limiting
A good virtualization solution needs to provide support for limiting the amount
of primary physical resources allocated to each container in order to prevent
containers from carrying out denial of service attacks described in section 4.
Since the 9.0 release FreeBSD utilizes Hierarchical Resource Limits (RCTL)
to provide resource limitation for users, processes or jails [13]. RCTL supports
defining an action in case a specified limit is reached: deny new resource al-
location, log a warning, send a signal (for example SIGHUP or SIGKILL) to
a process that exceeded the limit or to send a notification to the device state
change daemon.
Solaris implements resource management for zones using a number of tech-
niques that can be either applied to a whole zone or to a specific process inside
a zone. Resource partitioning, called resource pools, allows defining a set of re-
sources, such as a physical processor set, to be exclusively used by a zone. A
dynamic resource pool allows to adjusting the pool allocations based on the sys-
tem load. Resource capping is able to limit the amount of the physical memory
used by a zone.
The traditional way of managing resources on BSD-derived systems is the
rlimits mechanism that allows specifying soft and hard limits for system re-
sources for each process. Cells and Linux-VServer utilize rlimits to do resource
management for containers. However, the main problem of rlimits is that it does
not allow specifying limits for a set of processes or to define an action when a
limit is reached. Also the CPU and memory controls are very limited and do not
allow specifying the relative share of CPU time, number of virtual pages resident
in RAM or physical CPU or memory bank allocations.
In an attempt to address some of these limitations, OpenVZ and Linux-
VServer have implemented custom resource management extensions, such as
new limits for the maximum size of shared and anonymous memory or new
CPU scheduler mechanisms. In addition both virtualization solutions added the
possibility to specify resource limits per container.
Linux Control Groups (cgroups) [3] is a relatively new mechanism that aims
to address the downsides of rlimits. It allows arranging a set of processes into
hierarchical groups and performs resource management for the whole group. The
CPU and memory controls provided by cgroups are rich, and in addition it is
possible to implement a complex recovery management in case processes exceed
their assigned limits. LxC, Linux-VServer, OpenVZ and Cells provide a way to
use cgroups as a container resource management mechanism.
Table 4 presents a comparison of different aspects between rlimits and cgroups.
A combined use of these mechanisms allows protecting the container from a set
of DoS attacks directed towards the CPU, memory, disk I/O and filesystem
(rlimits combined with filesystem quotas). However, the future direction is to
aggregate all resource management to cgroups, and allow rlimits to be changed
by a privileged user inside a container5.
8 Related work
A number of previous studies have compared different aspects of the OS-level
virtualization to other virtualization solutions. Padala et al. [32] analyze the
performance of Xen vs. OpenVZ in the context of server consolidation. Chaud-
hary et al. [26], Regola et al. [36] and Xavier et al. [42] perform comparisons
of different virtualization technologies for HPC. Yang et al. [43] study the im-
pact of different virtualization technologies for the performance of the Hadoop
framework [46].
The Capsicum sandboxing framework [39] introduced in FreeBSD 9 isolates
processes from global kernel resources by disabling system calls which address
resources via global namespaces. Instead, resources are accessed via capabilities
which extend Unix file descriptors. Linux has a similar mechanism, called sec-
comp [18], that allows a process to restrict a set of systems calls that it can
execute. Both Capsicum and seccomp require modifications to existing applica-
tions.
While there are OS-level virtualization solutions such as ICore [4] and Sand-
boxie [14] in existence for Microsoft Windows as add-on solutions, we have left
5 documentation in source code of http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v3.13.5/kernel/
sys.c#L1368
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them out this report’s scope due to their closed nature. Authors are not aware
of any OS-level virtualization solutions for Mac OS X or iOS.
In addition to the OS-level virtualization solutions under comparison in this
study, researchers have developed a number of other technologies. An attempt
by Banga et al. [23] to do fine-grained resource management led to the creation
of a new facility for resource management in server systems called Resource Con-
tainers. Zap [31] allows the grouping of processes into Process Domains (PODs)
that provide a virtualized view of the system and support for CR. An OS-level
virtual machine architecture for Windows is proposed by Yu et al. [44]. A par-
tial OS-level virtualization is provided by the PDS environment by Alpern et
al. [21]. Wessel et al. [40] propose a solution for isolating user space instances on
Android similar to the Cells/Cellrox. The solution by Wessel et al. has a special
focus on security extensions, such as remote management, integrity protection
and storage encryption.
9 Discussion and Conclusions
All compared systems implement core container separation features in terms of
the memory, storage, network and process isolation. However, while the initial
innovation around containers happened on FreeBSD and Solaris, the mainline
Linux has caught up in terms of features and the flexibility of the implemen-
tation. Linux is likely to have a complete user space process environment vir-
tualization in course of time. Given the scale of deployment of Linux and the
maturity of its OS-level virtualization features, we focus on Linux in the rest of
this section.
Table 5 summaries the state of the OS-level virtualization supported by the
current upstream Linux kernel. The first row shows how each type of isolation
discussed in section 7 can be achieved using the currently available techniques.
The second row presents a number of gaps that are briefly described below.
Security namespaces. In order to reduce security exposure and adhere to
the principle of least privilege, many OSs provide an integrated mandatory ac-
cess control (MAC) mechanism. MACs can be used to strengthen the isolation
between different containers and the host, as well as to enforce MAC policies for
processes inside containers. The latter is especially important when the container
has a full OS installation, because it usually comes with pre-configured MAC
policies. Therefore, OS-level virtualization solutions should support the ability
to use the common MAC mechanisms in the underlying host kernel to enforce in-
dependently defined (container-specific) MAC policies. However, currently none
of the compared solutions fulfills this requirement. Linux kernel developers plan
to address this limitation in the future by introducing a security namespace that
would make LSMs container-aware.
IPC extensions. While IPC namespaces and filesystem isolation techniques
cover most of the inter-process communication methods available on Linux, ex-
ceptions exist. For example Transparent Inter-process Communication (TIPC) [16]
is not currently covered. TIPC is a network protocol that is designed for an inter-
cluster communication. Usage of such methods would break the IPC isolation
borders between containers and if the given features are not needed, they should
be disabled from the kernel configuration.
Device namespaces. As discussed in section 7.3, secure access to device
drivers from within a container remains an open problem. One way to approach
it would be to create a new namespace class (a device namespace) and group all
devices to belong in their own device namespaces in hierarchical manner, follow-
ing the generic namespace design pattern. Given this, only processes within the
same device namespace would be allowed to access devices belonging in it. How-
ever, since the core of such functionality would resemble more access/resource
control than a fully featured namespace, it was initially decided to implement
the functionality as a separate cgroups device controller. The discussions defin-
ing the full notion of the device namespace and its functionality continue in the
kernel community [5].
(Pseudo)random number generator devices. In section 7.3 we stated
that using stateless devices such as /dev/random or /dev/urandom are secure
within containers due to their stateless nature. This means that even if two con-
tainers share the same device, they cannot predict or influence the output from
another device node within another container. However, it is important to note
that exposing blocking devices, such as /dev/random, poses a Denial-of-Service
possibility. A malicious container can exhaust all available entropy and block
the /dev/random from being used in all other containers and the host, mak-
ing it impossible to perform cryptographic operations requiring random input.
Even if only non-blocking /dev/urandom is exposed, there is a theoretical pos-
sibility that a malicious container can predict the random output for another
container or a host. For example in [27] Dodis et al. give an assessment of both
/dev/random and /dev/urandom showing that these devices do not accumulate
entropy properly. A complete solution would be to implement a separate ran-
dom device per namespace or even introduce a namespace for (pseudo)random
number generators.
Hotplug support. Desktop Linux relies heavily on the dynamic nature
of device nodes. Once new devices are plugged in to the system, the kernel
generates an uevent structure notifying the user space of the new hardware. As
briefly explained in section 7.3, Uevent is typically handled by the udevd daemon
which configures the device for system use. Traditionally it has also created the
corresponding device node after device setup. As far as containers are concerned,
this setup is risky and complicated - containers should not be allowed to configure
hardware and/or have permissions for creating the new device nodes. As a result,
safe device hotplug for containers remains an open problem.
Incomplete implementation of cgroups. As was mentioned in the sec-
tion 7.6, the current goal of the upstream Linux is to integrate all features
supported by rlimits into the cgroups resource management. However this has
not been done yet and currently remains as work in progress.
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